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Executive summary
Regulatory control of nuclear materials (nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. In order to uphold the Finnish part of the 
international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation – mainly the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) – this regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the 
Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK).
Nuclear safeguards are applied to all materials and activities that can lead to the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons or sensitive nuclear technology. These safeguards include 
nuclear materials accountancy, control, security and reporting of nuclear fuel cycle related 
activities. The main parties involved in a state nuclear safeguards system are the facilities 
that use nuclear materials – often referred to as “license holders” or “operators” – and 
the state authority. A license holder shall take good care of its nuclear materials and 
the state authority shall provide the regulatory control to ensure that the license holder 
fulfils the requirements at the facility site. The control of non-nuclear technology holders 
and suppliers to ensure the non-proliferation of sensitive technology is a growing global 
challenge for all stakeholders. In the Finnish legislation all these stakeholders are dealt 
with as users of nuclear energy.
STUK maintains a central nuclear materials accountancy system and verifies that nuclear 
activities in Finland are carried out according to the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act and 
Decree, the European Union's (EU) legislation and international agreements. This task is 
carried out to guarantee that Finland can assure itself and the international community 
of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and materials. In addition to this, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) evaluates the success of the state safeguards 
system and the European Commission (EC) participates in safeguarding the materials 
under its jurisdiction.
Finland has a significant nuclear power production, but the related nuclear industry is 
rather limited. About 99.8% of the nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium) in Finland 
reside at the nuclear power plants (NPP) in Olkiluoto and Loviisa. Most of the remaining 
0.2% is at the VTT research reactor in Otaniemi, Espoo. Additionally, there are a dozen 
minor nuclear material holders in Finland.
The construction project in Olkiluoto for the final disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel 
does not involve any actual nuclear material yet, but nuclear safeguards are applied 
to the facility site already, to prepare for effective future safeguards. Thus the basic 
technical characteristics (BTC) of the final disposal facility were provided to the European 
Commission and to the IAEA. Accordingly, the non-nuclear buildings were declared as a 
site under the Additional Protocol (AP) to the IAEA and the first IAEA and Commission 
inspections were carried out in 2010.
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The construction project for the third reactor at the Olkiluoto NPP site is being provided 
turnkey by the consortium responsible for the delivery. The nuclear technology and 
instrumentation of the new facility are being imported and installed. The import licenses 
are reviewed as applicable to ensure the peaceful use of the technology. The IAEA and the 
Commission made their first site visits to the construction site prior to the installation of 
safeguards instrumentation and fuel delivery.
New nuclear facilities were authorised during 2010. The construction of new nuclear 
power reactors at two sites and the expansion of the geological repository in Olkiluoto 
were endorsed by the Finnish Parliament on 1 July 2010. These include the fourth reactor 
at the Olkiluoto power plant; a new nuclear power plant site, to be announced later by 
the applicant, the new power company Fennovoima; and the expansion of the geological 
repository to cover the volume applied for the spent fuel from the new Olkiluoto reactor. 
The new applicant Fennovoima is requested to submit a construction license application 
within 5 years and a plan for its waste management within 6 years time. The safeguards 
systems for these new facilities shall be designed in accordance with facility design.
Two new material balance areas in the front-end of the nuclear fuel cycle were assigned 
during the year. The bioheapleaching technique developed for large nickel deposits makes 
the extraction of other metals from low grade ore economically viable at the Talvivaara 
mine. Therefore, uranium may be economically extracted at the site as one of the by-
products of nickel. The Harjavalta nickel refinery applied for the licence to refine the 
Talvivaara nickel products. Uranium residuals will be extracted from the nickel. Industrial 
scale mineral processing may start in 2011 after nuclear licensing. The environmental 
impact assessments and public hearings regarding the authorisation of all these new 
facilities and activities were discussed in the media during 2010 making this one of the 
topics of the year.
The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2010 continued to 
demonstrate that Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. 
There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected 
materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders' declarations. STUK 
remarked on the nuclear safeguards systems of two of the licence holders in 2010, setting 
required actions to comply with the descriptions of their procedures and responsibilities for 
nuclear material accountancy and control systems.
The number of the inspection days of the international inspectorates is reduced 
significantly owing to the state-level integrated safeguards approach for Finland in force 
since 2008. Neither the IAEA nor the EC made any remarks nor did they present any 
required actions based on their inspections. By their nuclear materials accountancy and 
control systems, all licence holders enabled STUK to fulfil its own obligations under the 
international agreements relevant to nuclear safeguards.
The human resources development during 2010 was focused on nuclear forensics and 
security issues related to nuclear materials control. STUK and the Finnish Customs 
continued the joint multi-year border monitoring development project. The project covers 
updating technical equipment and operational procedures, and customs officers training. 
The competences at the Nuclear Materials Section were strengthened by one dissertation 
and one graduation.
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The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is one of the elements of the 
global nuclear non-proliferation effort. STUK has two roles in relation to the CTBT: 
STUK operates the Finnish National Data Centre (FiNDC) and one of the radionuclide 
laboratories (RL07) designated in the CTBT. The main task of the FiNDC is to inspect 
data received from the International Monitoring System (IMS) and to inform the national 
authority, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, about any indications of a nuclear weapons test. 
The FiNDC falls under the non-proliferation process in STUK’s organisation, together with 
the regulatory control of nuclear materials.
A major goal of all current CTBT related activities is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. 
An important prerequisite for such positive political action is that the verification system 
of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is functioning and 
able to provide assurance to all parties that it is impossible to make a clandestine nuclear 
test without getting detected. The FiNDC is committed to its own role in the common 
endeavour so that the verification system of the CTBTO can accomplish its detection task.
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Nuclear non-proliferation is a prerequisite for the 
peaceful use of nuclear materials and nuclear ener-
gy, globally. In order for Finland to have a nuclear 
industry, most of which consists of nuclear energy 
production, it must be ensured that nuclear ma-
terials, equipment, and technology are used only 
for their declared, peaceful purposes. The basis for 
nuclear safeguards is the national system for the 
regulatory control of nuclear materials and activi-
ties. Nuclear safeguards are an integral part of nu-
clear safety and nuclear security and they are ap-
plied both to large and medium-size nuclear indus-
try and to small-scale nuclear material activities. 
Along with the safeguards, the regulatory process 
for nuclear non-proliferation includes transport 
control, export control, border control, internation-
al cooperation and conventions, and monitoring 
compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty (CTBT).
1.1 International safeguards 
agreements and national legislation
Nuclear safeguards are based on international 
agreements, the most important and extensive of 
which is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT). 
The Treaty Establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom Treaty) is the basis 
for the nuclear safeguards system of the European 
Union (EU). Finland is bound by both of these trea-
ties, and also has several bilateral agreements in 
the area of peaceful use of nuclear energy. Upon 
joining the EU, Finland’s bilateral agreements with 
Australia, Canada and the USA were partly substi-
tuted by the corresponding Euratom agreements 
(see Appendix 3 for the relevant legislation).
Finland was the first state where an 
1 Nuclear non-proliferation 
implementation in Finland
INFCIRC¹/153-type nuclear Safeguards Agreement 
with the IAEA entered into force (INFCIRC/155, 9 
February 1972). When Finland joined the EU (1 
January 1995), this agreement was suspended and 
subsequently the Safeguards Agreement between 
the non-nuclear weapon Member States of the 
EU, the Euratom, and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193) 
entered into force in Finland, on 1 October 1995. 
Finland signed the Additional Protocol (AP) to 
the INFCIRC/193 in Vienna on 22 September 
1998, with the other EU Member States, and rati-
fied it on 8 August 2000. The Additional Protocol 
entered into force in April 30, 2004, when all the 
EU Member States had ratified it. The scope and 
mandate for Euratom nuclear safeguards are de-
fined in the European Commission Regulation No. 
302/2005.
After Finland joined EU as a Member State, 
and therefore joined the Euratom nuclear safe-
guards, a comprehensive national safeguards sys-
tem was still maintained. The basic motivation for 
this is the responsibility assumed by Finland for 
its nuclear safeguards and nuclear security under 
the obligations of the NPT.
The national nuclear safeguards derive their 
mandate and scope from the Finnish Nuclear 
Energy Act and Decree. These were amended dur-
ing 2008 as a result of the general constitution-
based renewal of the Finnish nuclear legislation 
system. The operator’s obligation to have a nuclear 
material accountancy system and the right of 
STUK to oversee the planning of and generation 
of design information for new facilities was intro-
duced from STUK regulations to the Decree.
¹  INFCIRC = IAEA Information Circulars
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As stipulated by the Act, STUK issues de-
tailed regulations on safety and security (the yVL 
guides) that apply to the use of nuclear energy. 
The yVL guides most relevant to nuclear safe-
guards are:
•	 �������	��	�������	����	���	�����	�������	�����Control of nuclear fuel and other nuclear mate-
rials required in the operation of nuclear power 
plants (guide yVL 6.1)
•	 ���	��������	������	��	����������	���	���	����The national system of accounting for and con-
trol of nuclear materials (guide yVL 6.9)
•	Reports to be submitted on nuclear materials 
(guide yVL 6.10).
All STUK yVL guides are under renovation. The 
guides relevant to safeguards shall be merged into 
one joint new guide. The draft version has already 
been communicated to the stakeholders. The new 
guides shall be issued by the end of 2011.
Nuclear materials control applies to:
•	 nuclear material (special fissionable material 
and source material)
•	 nuclear dual use items (non-nuclear materials, 
components, equipment and data suitable for 
producing nuclear energy or nuclear weapons 
as specified in INFCIRC/254, Part 1)
•	 �������	 ��������	 �����������	 ����������	 ���������licence holders’ activities, expertise, prepared-
ness and competence
•	R&D activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle
•	 nuclear security, and
•	 ����������	���	���	�	���	��������	��	�����	������safeguards for the final disposal of spent nucle-
ar fuel.
1.2 Parties of the Finnish nuclear 
safeguards system
The main parties involved in the Finnish nuclear 
safeguards system are the authorities and the li-
cence holders. Undistributed responsibility for the 
safety, security and safeguards of the use nuclear 
energy is on the licence holder. It is the responsibil-
ity of STUK as the competent state authority to 
ensure that the license holders comply with the re-
quirements of the law and the nuclear safeguards 
agreements. To complement the national effort, 
international control is necessary to demonstrate 
credibility and the proper functioning of the na-
tional safeguards system.
1.2.1 Ministries
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) is responsi-
ble for national non-proliferation policy and inter-
national agreements. The MFA is responsible for 
the export licensing of nuclear materials and other 
nuclear dual use items including sensitive nuclear 
technology. The Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy (MEE) is the highest authority for man-
agement and control of nuclear energy. MEE is re-
sponsible for legislation related to nuclear energy 
and it is also the competent authority mentioned 
in the Euratom Treaty. Also other ministries, such 
as the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of 
Defence contribute to the efficient functioning of 
the national nuclear safeguards system.
1.2.2 STUK
According to the Finnish nuclear legislation, STUK 
is responsible for maintaining the national nuclear 
safeguards system in order to prevent proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. STUK regulates the license 
holders’ activities and ensures that the obligations 
of international agreements concerning peaceful 
use of nuclear materials are met. Regulatory con-
trol by STUK includes the possession, use, produc-
tion, transfer (national and international), han-
dling, storage, transport, export and import of nu-
clear material and nuclear dual use items. STUK 
is in charge of Finland’s approval and consultation 
process for IAEA and European Commission in-
spectors. STUK approves an inspector as long as 
there are no such issues related to the person in 
question that might adversely affect nuclear safety 
or security at Finnish facilities or the non-prolif-
eration of nuclear weapons. The new inspector re-
quests are sent for comments to the operators that 
hold construction or operating licenses for nuclear 
facilities. If STUK cannot approve an inspector, 
it assigns the approval process to the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy.
Nuclear safeguards by the Nuclear Materials 
Section of STUK (see Figure 1 for the organisa-
tional chart and Figure 12 for the staff) cover all 
typical measures of a State System of Accounting 
for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC), and 
many other activities besides. STUK reviews the 
STUK-B 128
11
license holders’ reports (operational notifications, 
inventory reports), inspects their accountancy, fa-
cilities and transport arrangements on site, and 
performs system audits. Office work constitutes 
90% of the inspection effort. STUK runs a verifi-
cation programme for nuclear activities to assess 
the completeness and correctness of the declara-
tions by the licence holders. Nuclear safeguards 
on the national level are closely linked with other 
functions of nuclear materials control and non-
proliferation: licensing, export control, border con-
trol, transport control, combating illicit trafficking, 
the physical protection of nuclear materials, and 
monitoring compliance with the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) – all duties of 
the STUK Nuclear Materials Section. Nuclear 
safety and particularly nuclear security objectives 
are closely complemented by safeguards objec-
tives. Therefore, the research, development and 
regulatory units in the fields of safety, security 
and safeguards at STUK cooperate under the non-
proliferation framework.
1.2.3 License holders
Essential parts of the national nuclear safeguards 
system are the licence holders, in nuclear terminol-
ogy often called the operators. They perform key 
functions of the national safeguards system: con-
trol of the authentic source data of their nuclear 
materials and accountancy of nuclear material at 
the facility level for each of their material balance 
areas (MBA). Each license holder has to operate 
its safeguards system according to its own nuclear 
materials handbook. The handbook is a part of the 
facility’s quality system and is reviewed and ap-
proved by STUK.
With the basic technical characteristics (BTC) 
submitted by a license holder as groundwork, 
the European Commission shall adopt particu-
lar safeguards provisions (PSP) for that license 
holder. PSP are to be drawn taking into account 
operational and technical constraints and in close 
consultation with both the person or undertaking 
concerned and the relevant member state. Until 
PSP are adopted, the person or undertaking shall 
Security Technology
Nuclear Security
Nuclear Materials Section
Figure 1. Several departments and independent units of STUK cooperate under the non-proliferation framework.
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apply the general provisions of the Commission 
regulation No 302/2005.
99.8% of all nuclear materials in Finland reside 
at the nuclear power plants (NPP). The nuclear 
material (uranium, plutonium) amounts in Finland 
in 1992–2010 are presented in Figures 2 and 3.
Fortum (MBA WL0V)
Fortum is a partly state-owned energy company, 
one of the largest in the Nordic countries. Fortum 
operates power plants of several types, nuclear 
among others.
The nuclear power plant of Fortum Power and 
Heat is located on the Hästholmen Island in 
Loviisa on the south-east coast of Finland. This 
first NPP to have been built in Finland hosts 
two power reactor units: Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2. 
Loviisa 1 started its electricity production in 1977 
and Loviisa 2 in 1980. These two units share com-
mon fresh and spent fuel storages and for nuclear 
safeguards accountancy purposes the whole NPP 
is counted as one material balance area (MBA code 
WL0V). The electricity generated by the Loviisa 
NPP constitutes ca. 10% of the whole electricity 
production in Finland.
Most of the fuel for the Loviisa NPP has 
been imported from the Soviet Union / Russian 
Federation. The spent fuel of the Loviisa NPP was 
returned to the Soviet Union / Russian Federation 
until 1996 and since then the spent fuel has been 
stored in the interim storage due to a change in the 
Finnish nuclear legislation, which today forbids, in 
general, import and export of nuclear waste includ-
ing spent fuel.
The Loviisa NPP site (SSFLOV1), as per the 
requirements of the Additional Protocol, comprises 
the entire Hästholmen Island and extends to the 
main gate on the continent. Particular Safeguards 
Provisions for the Loviisa NPP, which define the 
European Commission’s nuclear safeguards pro-
cedures for the facility, have been in force since 
1998. The Facility Attachment of the Safeguards 
0
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Figure 3. Plutonium amount in Finland in 1992–2010.
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Figure 2. Uranium amount in Finland in 1992–2010.
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Agreement INFCIRC/193 has not been prepared 
for the Loviisa NPP.
Teollisuuden Voima (MBAs W0L1, 
W0L2, W0LS and W0L3)
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) owns and operates 
a nuclear power plant on the Olkiluoto Island in 
Eurajoki on the west coast of Finland. The Olkiluoto 
NPP consists of two nuclear power reactor units, 
Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2, and an interim spent 
fuel storage. Olkiluoto 1 was connected to the elec-
tricity grid in 1978 and Olkiluoto 2 in 1980. The 
Olkiluoto NPP contributes ca. 16% of the whole 
electricity production in Finland. At the Olkiluoto 
NPP there are three active material balance areas 
(MBA codes W0L1, W0L2, W0LS).
Presently, the uranium in TVO’s nuclear fuel 
is mainly of Australian, Canadian and Russian 
origin. This uranium is enriched in the Russian 
Federation or in the EU and the fuel assemblies 
are manufactured in Spain and Sweden.
The Finnish government granted a licence for 
constructing a new nuclear reactor, Olkiluoto 3, 
on 17 February 2005. As a part of the licensing 
process, TVO’s plan for arranging the necessary 
measures for preventing proliferation of nuclear 
weapons was approved by STUK. The construction 
and assembly work of the reactor unit is under way. 
The European Commission has assigned the MBA 
code W0L3 for Olkiluoto 3. The initial criticality of 
the reactor is scheduled for 2013.
New nuclear facilities were granted by the 
government on 6 May 2010. One of these was the 
Olkiluoto 4 reactor. The geotechnical site charac-
terisation works at the Olkiluoto 4 site began in 
2010. The selection of the vendor and the supply 
organisation shall take place in the near future.
TVO owns most of the area of the Olkiluoto 
Island, but the NPP site (SSFOLK1), as per the 
requirements of the Additional Protocol, comprises 
currently the fenced areas around the reactor units, 
the spent fuel storage and the storage for low and 
intermediate level waste as well as the Olkiluoto 3 
construction site. Particular Safeguards Provisions 
for the Olkiluoto NPP have been in force since 
2007. The Facility Attachment of the Safeguards 
Agreement INFCIRC/193 has not been prepared 
for the Olkiluoto NPP.
VTT FiR1 research reactor (MBA WRRF)
Small amounts of nuclear materials are located at 
facilities other than nuclear power plants. The most 
significant of those facilities is the VTT research re-
actor FiR1 (MBA code WRRF) in Otaniemi, Espoo. 
The research reactor was the first nuclear reactor 
built in Finland. It reached criticality on 27 March 
1962.
Particular Safeguards Provisions that define 
the European Commission’s nuclear safeguards 
procedures for the facility have been in force for 
VTT FiR1 from 1998. The Facility Attachment of 
the Safeguards Agreement INFCIRC/193 has not 
been prepared for the research reactor.
The VTT FiR1 site (SSFVTT1), as per the re-
quirements of the Additional Protocol, consists of 
the whole building around the research reactor, 
although there are non-nuclear companies and 
university premises in the same building.
STUK (MBA WFRS)
Small quantities of nuclear materials are stored 
by the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Authority (STUK), mainly material no longer in 
use and hence taken into STUK’s custody. STUK 
was founded in 1958 and is located at its cur-
rent premises in Roihupelto, Helsinki since 1994. 
The STUK MBA (WFRS) consists of the STUK 
headquarters and the “Central interim storage for 
small-user radioactive waste” at the Olkiluoto NPP 
site.
The STUK site (SSFSTUK), as per the require-
ments of the Additional Protocol, consists of the 
whole building where STUK’s headquarters are 
located in Helsinki, but non-STUK premises in the 
building are excluded. The storage at Olkiluoto is 
included in the NPP’s site declaration.
The University of Helsinki, Laboratory 
of Radiochemistry (MBA WHEL)
The Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the University 
of Helsinki (HyRL) uses small amounts of nuclear 
materials. HyRL is located at the Kumpula univer-
sity campus in Helsinki.
The HyRL site (SSFHyRL), as per the require-
ments of the Additional Protocol, comprises the 
whole building that hosts the laboratory.
14
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OMG Kokkola Chemicals (MBA WKK0)
The OMg Kokkola Chemicals facility does not use 
nuclear materials as such. However, the by-prod-
ucts of their cobalt purification process contain 
uranium, which qualifies these by-products as nu-
clear material. OMg Kokkola Chemicals has an 
operation license for production, storing and han-
dling nuclear material. OMg Kokkola Chemicals is 
located on the west coast of Finland.
Other nuclear material holders
There are about 10 minor nuclear material holders 
in Finland. One of them is an actual material bal-
ance area: University of Jyväskylä, Department of 
Physics (JyFL, MBA code WDPJ), but in fact the 
nuclear material in JyFL has been derogated and 
exempted by the European Commission and the 
IAEA. Other minor nuclear material holders are 
members of a Catch-All-MBA (CAM), for purposes 
of international nuclear safeguards. Most of these 
have depleted uranium as radiation shielding ma-
terial.
New operators and new MBAs
The Talvivaara mine announced on 9 February 
2010 its interest to investigate the recovery of 
uranium as a separate product from its sulphide 
ore body. Moreover, the Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta 
nickel refinery has prepared itself for the process-
ing of the Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd. nickel products 
including processing and separation of uranium. 
Both companies have submitted their licence ap-
plications as well as their BTC to the European 
Commission. The processing of the uranium prod-
ucts is expected to take place in 2011. The MBA 
code WTAL is assigned for the future uranium 
mine at Talvivaara, and the MBA code WNNH for 
the nickel refinery at Harjavalta. The progress in is 
described in detail in Chapter 2 – one of the major 
themes of the year.
New nuclear facilities were granted by the 
government on 6 May 2010. One of these was 
the nuclear power plant for the new applicant 
Fennovoima. The company has two options to lo-
cate its plant and the reactor(s). The construction 
license is expected to be submitted in five years. 
This major milestone in Finnish nuclear history is 
also one of the themes of the year 2010.
Posiva (MBA W0LF)
Posiva Oy is the company responsible for the fi-
nal disposal of spent nuclear fuel in Finland. It 
is owned by TVO and Fortum. Posiva has been 
excavating an underground rock characterisation 
facility called “Onkalo” in Eurajoki since 2004, and 
thus preparing for the construction of the final 
disposal facility. While neither a nuclear license 
holder nor a nuclear material holder yet, Posiva 
and its activities are highly relevant to the nation-
al safeguards system because Posiva is foreseen to 
develop a new type of facility, the geological reposi-
tory, where the nuclear material cannot be re-ver-
ified once it has been encapsulated and emplaced. 
In the IAEA safeguards approaches it has been 
suggested that the geological formation should be 
under safeguards during the whole lifetime of the 
underground facility. Therefore, Posiva has been 
required to develop a non-proliferation handbook, 
such as a nuclear materials handbook, to describe 
Posiva’s safeguards procedures and reporting sys-
tem already before becoming a nuclear material 
holder. The preliminary basic technical character-
istics (BTC) have been provided and the European 
Commission has already assigned the MBA code 
W0LF for Onkalo. The facility without nuclear 
materials but having the BTC constitutes a site 
according to the Additional Protocol. The Posiva 
site (SSFPOS1) covers the fenced area around the 
buildings supporting the repository construction. 
The Decision-in-Principle of 6 May 2010 included 
the enlargement of the capacity of the disposal 
facility to include spent fuel disposal of its owners; 
i.e., as applied for the spent fuel of the Olkiluoto 4 
reactor.
Other stakeholders
Non-nuclear technology holders and suppliers serv-
ing nuclear and other industry are obliged to take 
care that non-proliferation sensitive technology is 
not getting into the hands of unauthorized non-
state actors and thereby contributing to prolifera-
tion of mass destruction means. The introduction of 
the Additional Protocol (1996) extended the scope 
of safeguards to the non-proliferation control of nu-
clear programmes and fuel cycle related activities 
in Member States around the world. Additionally, 
the United Nations Security Council Resolution 
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1540 (April 2004) requires every State to ensure 
that export controls, border controls, material ac-
countancy and physical protection are efficiently 
taken care of and calls all States to develop appro-
priate ways to work with and inform industry and 
the public regarding their obligations. The control 
of non-nuclear technology holders and suppliers to 
ensure the non-proliferation and peaceful use of 
sensitive technology and dual-use items is a grow-
ing global challenge for all stakeholders.
Nuclear safeguards is commonly seen as the 
traditional nuclear material accountancy and re-
porting system, the main stakeholders of which 
are the international, regional and local authori-
ties, and the operators. According to the enlarged 
non-proliferation regime and the amendments to 
the Finnish legislation, the companies having ac-
tivities defined in the Additional Protocol or hav-
ing customers for dual-use equipment abroad are 
under strengthened reporting requirements and 
export control.
1.3 IAEA and Euratom 
safeguards in Finland
The IAEA and the European Commission nuclear 
safeguards both have their separate mandates to 
operate in Finland. These two international in-
spectorates have agreed on cooperation (New 
Partnership Approach, NPA), which aims to reduce 
undue duplication of effort. year 2009 introduced a 
significant change from the traditional safeguards 
procedures in Finland as the implementation of in-
tegrated safeguards began on 15 October 2008.
Integrated safeguards include traditional nu-
clear safeguards as per INFCIRC/193, and safe-
guards activities in accordance with the Additional 
Protocol, fitted together. While this should not 
lead to an increase in inspections, it should en-
able the IAEA to assure itself of the absence of 
undeclared nuclear activities in a state. In practice, 
the number of IAEA routine interim inspections 
decreases. In contrast to this, the IAEA will addi-
tionally perform 1–3 unannounced or short notice 
inspections per year in a state that has a number 
and type of nuclear installations that resembles 
the situation in Finland.
The operators are reporting to the European 
Commission as required per Commission 
Safeguards regulation. It is the Commission’s task 
to audit the license holders’ accounting and report-
ing systems. Both the Commission and STUK have 
increased preparedness for short notice and unan-
nounced inspections and complementary access 
(abbreviated SNUICA). One of STUK’s inspectors 
is daily prepared to attend, on alert, to a possible 
IAEA inspection.
The number of IAEA and Euratom routine 
inspections decreased in 2009 significantly as de-
fined in the state-level safeguards approach for 
Finland, which was negotiated during 2007 and 
2008 (see infobox). The time difference between 
the unannounced inspections at the two spent fuel 
storages (i.e. 2 hours for Loviisa and 48 hours for 
Olkiluoto) is due to the difference in the surveil-
lance at the storages and reasonable access time 
for a STUK inspector. The notification time will be 
harmonised to 24 hours after the installation of 
new surveillance equipment at the Loviisa storage. 
The national State System of Accounting for and 
Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) continues with 
annual routines with approximately 40 inspec-
tions, which enables the reduction in the effort of 
the international inspectorates.
IAEA regular inspections:
Facilities at nuclear power plants (NPP):
•	 Physical	Inventory	Verification	(PIV)	/	Design	
Information	Verification	(DIV)	1/year
•	 Random	 Interim	 Inspection	 (RII)	 at	 24/48	 h	
notification	(at	least	1/year)
Spent fuel storages at NPPs
•	 PIV/DIV	1/year
•	 RII	at	2h	i.e.	Unannounced	Inspection	(UI)/48h	
notification	(at	least	1/year)
Research reactor and locations outside facilities 
(LOF)
•	 PIV/DIV	1/4–6	years
New reactor (OL3), under construction
•	 DIV	and	PIV	later	like	at	the	NPPs
Repository (Onkalo), under construction
•	 PIV/DIV	most	likely	as	at	spent	fuel	storages
Complementary	accesses	at	2/24	h	notification	to	
verify declared activities or to detect undeclared 
activities.
16
STUK-B 128
1.4 Verified declarations for 
state evaluations
A state’s declarations on its nuclear materials and 
activities are the basis for the state evaluation by 
the IAEA under the obligations of the Additional 
Protocol. In Finland, the state has delegated its re-
sponsibility for these declarations to STUK. STUK 
has been nominated a site representative, as per 
European Commission regulation No 302/2005. 
STUK collects, inspects and reviews the relevant 
information and then submits the compiled decla-
rations timely to the Commission and the IAEA.
In Finland, there are six sites in the sense of the 
Additional Protocol: the two nuclear power plant 
(NPP) sites in Loviisa and Olkiluoto respectively, 
the geological repository site in Olkiluoto, and 
three minor sites: the Technical Research Centre 
of Finland (VTT), the Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority (STUK) and the Laboratory of 
Radiochemistry at the University of Helsinki 
(HyRL). STUK reviews and verifies the correct-
ness and completeness of the information about 
the sites provided by the stakeholders.
STUK reviews annually the information about 
research and development activities that might be 
eligible for declaration, as well as activities speci-
fied in Annex I of the Additional Protocol. STUK 
maintains the information on general plans related 
to the nuclear fuel cycle for the next 10 years and 
keeps account of the exports of specified equipment 
and non-nuclear materials, as listed in Annex II of 
the Additional Protocol.
Technical analysis methods are one tool for a 
state nuclear safeguards system to ensure that nu-
clear materials and activities within the state are 
in accordance with the licence holders’ declarations 
and that there are no undeclared activities. Such 
methods can provide information on the identity 
of the nuclear materials and confirm that licence 
holders’ declarations are correct and complete with 
respect to e.g. the enrichment of uranium, the bur-
nup, and the cooling time of nuclear fuel. The tech-
nical analysis methods in use are non-destructive 
assay (NDA) and environmental sampling and 
satellite imagery.
STUK employs three NDA methods for verify-
ing spent nuclear fuel. One method lends itself for 
rapid scanning, as the detector is mounted on the 
fuel transfer machine and the fuel elements can be 
measured from above the fuel pond without moving 
the elements. The other two methods, on the other 
hand, allow confirming with greater confidence the 
correctness of the declared burnup and the cooling 
time. With the most precise method, the absence of 
a fuel pin or pins from a fuel element can be dis-
covered. STUK reports to the Commission and the 
IAEA about the NDA measurement campaigns.
All nuclear materials leave traces of their iden-
tity, source of origin and treatment. Safeguards 
environmental samples (ES) are used to investi-
gate these traces, which provide further clarity in 
establishing whether the nuclear activities are in 
accordance with the declarations. In the Finnish 
nuclear safeguards system environmental samples 
are collected as surface swipes. The IAEA may col-
lect independent environmental samples during its 
complementary access type of inspections.
Satellite imagery is applied to verify the site 
declaration pursuant to the Additional Protocol. 
Timely imagery is used to monitor different kinds 
of activities at the sites or elsewhere in Finland. 
STUK contributes to the work of satellite image 
analysts of the IAEA and the Commission.
1.5 Export/import control and 
licensing as elements of 
nuclear non-proliferation
According to the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act, in 
addition to nuclear materials also other nuclear 
fuel cycle related activities are under regulatory 
control. A license is required for possession, trans-
fer and import of components, equipment, materi-
als and technology suitable for producing nuclear 
energy (nuclear dual use items).
The list of these other items is based on Nuclear 
Suppliers’ group (NSg) guidelines (INFCIRC/254 
Part 1). The license holder is required to provide 
STUK annually with a list of the above mentioned 
items. Moreover, the export, import, and transfer of 
such items shall be reported to STUK.
Mining and mineral processing operations that 
aim to produce uranium or thorium are also under 
nuclear safeguards and regulatory nuclear safety 
control. Anyone carrying out these activities shall 
have a license and an accounting system to keep 
track of the amounts of uranium and thorium. A 
license is also required to export and import urani-
um or thorium ore, and these activities shall be re-
ported to STUK and to the European Commission.
Finland’s export control system is based on 
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the EU Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 
5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for 
the control of exports, transfer, brokering and 
transit of dual-use items. The export of Nuclear 
Suppliers’ group (NSg) Part 1 and Part 2 items 
is regulated by the Finnish Act on the Control of 
Exports of Dual Use goods. The licensing authority 
is the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. An authorisa-
tion is required to export nuclear items outside the 
European Union. A license is also required for EU 
internal transfers of NSg Part 1 items, excluding 
non-sensitive nuclear materials.
1.6 The regulatory control of transport 
covers nuclear materials
The requirements for the transport of radioactive 
material are set in the Finnish regulations on the 
transport of dangerous goods. The requirements 
are based on the IAEA safety standard Regulations 
for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, TS-
R-1, and their purpose is to protect people, envi-
ronment and property from the harmful effects of 
radiation during the transport of radioactive mate-
rial. Based on these regulations, STUK is the com-
petent national authority for the regulatory control 
regarding the transport of radioactive material.
In addition to the dangerous goods transport 
regulations, the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act sets 
specific requirements for the transport of nuclear 
material: a licence granted by STUK is needed for 
such a transport. Usually the transport licences are 
granted for a fixed period, typically for a few years. 
A transport plan and a security plan approved by 
STUK are mandatory for each transport of nuclear 
material. A certificate of nuclear liability insurance 
shall also be delivered to STUK before the trans-
port. Furthermore, a package may be used for the 
transport of fissile nuclear material only after the 
package design has been approved by STUK.
1.7 STUK’s contribution to international 
safeguards development
Nuclear non-proliferation is, by its nature, an inter-
national domain. STUK therefore actively partici-
pates in international nuclear safeguards related 
cooperation and development efforts.
STUK is a member of the European Safeguards 
Research and Development Association (ESARDA), 
and has nominated Finnish experts to its commit-
tees and most of the working groups. STUK partic-
ipates in the ESARDA Executive Board meetings 
and the Presidency of ESARDA is currently held 
by a STUK representative.
The Standing Advisory group on Safeguards 
Implementation (SAgSI) comprises a group of 
nuclear safeguards experts from the IAEA Member 
States, appointed by the IAEA Director general 
to advise on safeguards implementation issues. 
For the first half of 2010 one of the experts in this 
group was a STUK staff member.
Upon request by the IAEA, STUK’s experts have 
contributed to the IAEA’s international evaluation 
missions, such as the International SSAC Advisory 
Service (ISSAS). The ISSAS mission reviews State 
Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear 
Materials (SSAC) and provides suggestions for im-
proving them.
STUK keeps close contacts with the respective 
Nordic authority organisations. The development 
of the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geologi-
cal repositories deepens the cooperation between 
Finland and Sweden.
1.8 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty: a global technology-
based non-proliferation tool
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) is an important part of the international 
regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons. The CTBT bans any nuclear weapon test ex-
plosions in any environment. This ban is aimed 
at constraining the development and qualitative 
improvement of nuclear weapons, including also 
the development of advanced new types of nuclear 
weapons.
The CTBT was adopted by the United Nations 
general Assembly, and was opened for signature 
in New york on 24 September 1996. The CTBT 
will enter into force after it has been ratified by 
the 44 states listed in its Annex 2. These 44 states 
participated in the 1996 session of the Conference 
on Disarmament and possess nuclear power or re-
search reactors.
A global verification regime is being established 
in order to monitor compliance with the CTBT. The 
verification regime consists of the following ele-
ments: the International Monitoring System (IMS), 
a consultation and clarification process, on-site in-
spections and confidence-building measures.
Finland has signed and ratified the CTBT. In 
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addition to complying with the basic requirement 
of the CTBT of not to carry out any nuclear weap-
ons tests, Finland takes part in the development of 
the verification regime.
In the CTBT framework, the Finnish nation-
al authority is the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
STUK has two roles: STUK operates the Finnish 
National Data Centre (FiNDC) and one of the ra-
dionuclide laboratories (RL07) designated in the 
CTBT. The most important task of the FiNDC is 
to inspect data received from the IMS and inform 
the national authority about any indications of a 
nuclear weapons test. The radionuclide laboratory 
contributes to the IMS by providing support in the 
radionuclide analyses and in the quality control of 
the radionuclide station network. The third major 
national collaborator is the Institute of Seismology 
at the University of Helsinki, which runs an IMS 
seismology station (PS17 in Lahti), and provides 
analysis of waveform IMS data (Figure 4).
1.9 Nuclear safeguards and nuclear 
security have much in common
STUK is the national authority for the regulatory 
control of nuclear and radiological safety, security 
and safeguards. All these three regimes are means 
to a common end: protection of people, society, envi-
ronment and future generations from the harmful 
effects of ionising radiation. From the definition 
of nuclear security, it is clear that the majority 
of the activities that aim at non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, nuclear materials and sensitive 
nuclear technology contribute to nuclear security. 
Moreover, such classical elements of security as 
physical protection of nuclear materials and facili-
ties contribute to non-proliferation. Within STUK’s 
organisation, some of its nuclear security related 
tasks fall – solely or partly – under the duties 
of the nuclear non-proliferation process and the 
Nuclear Materials Section:
•	 ��������	������	 ���	 ���	�������	��	�������	���national system for the control of nuclear ma-
terials and nuclear dual use items facilitating 
international nuclear safeguards activities in 
Finland
•	 regulatory control of the transport of nuclear 
materials
•	 import and export control
•	 advice to the Finnish Customs on radiation 
monitoring at the borders, in concept develop-
ment and technical specifications; training for 
Customs officers
•	 participation in the work of the international 
nuclear safeguards and nuclear security com-
munities and working groups (IAEA, ESARDA, 
AQg, ITWg…)
•	 participation in STUK’s response in cases of 
radiological or nuclear incidents
•	 advice to the Finnish Customs on interpretation 
of radiation detections at borders, more sophis-
ticated on-site measurements and analyses in 
response to border monitoring alarms.
Figure 4. The Finnish CTBT organisation.
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) Status (31.12.2010)
•	 CTBT	Member	States	 182
•	 Total	Ratifications	 153
•	 Annex	2	Ratifications	 35
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The Finnish regulatory system for nuclear security 
was audited by an IPPAS mission in 2009. One 
of the recommendations arising from the audit, 
namely the need for more detailed security re-
quirements for minor holders of nuclear materi-
als, was in the Nuclear Materials Section’s area of 
responsibility. As a result, the new yVL guide for 
nuclear materials control, under review since 2010 
and expected to come into force in 2011, will con-
tain more detailed security requirements for these 
minor holders.
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2 Themes of the year 2010
2.1 Improvements in implementing 
Integrated Safeguards
STUK has organised information meetings on 
the effects of integrated safeguards for the nu-
clear power plant operators and preparatory tri-
lateral meetings with the IAEA and the European 
Commission since 2007. During 2010 the imple-
mentation procedures were reviewed at four meet-
ings. The new safeguards directors of the IAEA and 
the Commission visited Finland and the Olkiluoto 
construction sites and familiarised themselves 
with the current practises and the State Systems 
of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials 
(SSAC). In the future the role of the SSAC may be 
strengthened, e.g. by enabling remote inspections 
and substituting the international inspectors to a 
certain extent. The current practice and future ex-
pectations of the Finnish SSAC were described in 
the extensive presentation of the Nuclear Materials 
Section at the IAEA safeguards symposium in 
November 2010.
2.2 The NPT Review Conference 
and the IAEA Safeguards 
Symposium – international 
highlights of the year 2010
The Status of the implementation of the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was reviewed by 
the Member States in a Review Conference in May 
2010 in New york. The Conference succeeded in gen-
erating a final consensus document. Additionally, 
the spirit and the focus were on planning commit-
ments for the future. Non-Proliferation Treaty im-
plementation should be further enhanced; the IAEA 
should implement Comprehensive Agreements 
efficiently; the Additional Protocol is appreciated 
as an efficient mechanism, but not approved as 
current standard. National safeguards and coop-
eration with the IAEA should be strengthened and 
all nuclear material in civilian use, including that 
in Nuclear Weapon States, should be subjected to 
IAEA safeguards. Peaceful use of nuclear ener-
gy should be supported e.g. via multinational ap-
proaches to fuel cycle services.
Ambitious objectives were set in New york. 
These included prompt negotiation of a new START 
agreement, abolishment of nuclear weapons for 
good, negative security assurances for non-nuclear 
weapon states, ratification of the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), negotiation of a 
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), support to 
UN Secretary general’s initiative for negotiation 
of a nuclear weapons convention. The Conference 
agreed on the action plan aimed at facilitating the 
negotiations for the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone 
(NWFZ) for the Middle-East.
The IAEA international safeguards symposium 
“Preparing for Future Verification Challenges” was 
held in November 2010 in Vienna. Issues discussed 
included IAEA safeguards challenges and oppor-
tunities for the IAEA itself and its Member States 
due to increased expectations and new roles and 
activities, the increasing interest in nuclear energy 
and the consequent expansion in nuclear trade, 
and the need to further enhance the Agency’s ca-
pabilities to detect undeclared nuclear activities. 
In addition to the non-proliferation regime, the 
success of the NPT Review Conference and new 
challenges in disarmament, and ways to move to 
a nuclear-weapons-free world were in focus. STUK 
made a strong contribution by giving the opening 
statement “Change and Verify”, by moderating 
two panel sessions, and by presenting two papers 
and several posters (see Figures 5–7). The Security 
Technology group of STUK won the best poster 
award in the Session for Indicators, Forensics and 
Environmental Sampling with their presentation 
of the position-sensitive detection system that 
uses the Particles And Non-Destructive Analysis 
(PANDA) device.
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2.3 Licenses for new power 
plants in Finland
Three power companies and the spent fuel man-
agement company submitted their applications 
during 2008 and 2009 for a Decision-in-Principle 
to construct new nuclear power plants in Finland. 
During 2009 STUK reviewed these applications 
for nuclear safety, security, safeguards etc. as de-
fined in the Nuclear Energy Act. The plan to con-
duct the non-proliferation control was reviewed 
by the Nuclear Materials Section. The nuclear fu-
ture in Finland was discussed in public during the 
whole year 2009, and a decision was prepared at 
the Ministry for Employment and the Economy in 
the beginning of 2010. The government approved 
three Decisions-in-Principle on 6 May 2010, for 
TVO’s Olkiluoto 4 unit, Posiva’s spent fuel man-
agement project related to Olkiluoto 4, as well as 
Fennovoima’s nuclear power plant. The Parliament 
ratified these decisions on 1 July 2010. The appli-
cants for new power plants are requested to sub-
mit their nuclear construction license applications 
within 5 years. The applications concerning a third 
unit in Loviisa and Posiva’s related project were 
rejected by the government on 6 May 2010.
In its application the new nuclear stakeholder 
Fennovoima proposed two options for the location 
of its nuclear power plant. In the beginning of 2011, 
Fennovoima will choose the location and select the 
type of reactor to be built either at Pyhäjoki in 
North Ostrobothnia or at Simo in Lapland. Both of 
these are located at the sea coast of Bay of Bothnia. 
The choice will be based on assessments on safety, 
environmental concerns, technical implementation 
conditions and construction costs. The founda-
tion works at the chosen site are scheduled to 
begin in 2012. It is estimated that the power plant 
will generate electricity by 2020. According to the 
Decision-in-Principle, the applicant Fennovoima 
was requested to make a plan for its nuclear waste 
management in 6 years time.
Figure 5. Presidents of ESARDA and INMM after giving 
opening statements at the IAEA Safeguards Sympo-
sium.
Figure 6. Ms. Martikka is moderating the session on 
state experiences on the implementation of integrated 
safeguards.
Figure 7. The award winning poster and the main 
 author Sakari Ihantola.
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The authorisation of the three new nuclear 
facilities did not generate much work load at the 
Nuclear Materials Section during 2010. However, 
the practices obtained at the current construction 
sites in Olkiluoto clearly pointed out the need to 
bring in the safeguards requirements at an early 
stage of facility design. The early design informa-
tion is generated, in principle, before the construc-
tion, but when planning the installation of contain-
ment and surveillance equipment and cabling, 
some of the desired precautions were missing both 
at the Olkiluoto 3 and the Onkalo facilities since 
they were not indicated in the official documents 
early enough. In order to improve and facilitate 
the future implementation of safeguards at new 
facilities STUK joined the Safeguards by Design 
Support Programme of the IAEA and initiated 
negotiations with all stakeholders to have the 3-S 
(safety, security, safeguards) concept included in 
the design requirements of new facilities.
2.4 New Front-End Facilities
A sulphide mine with uranium resources
The Talvivaara Mining Company announced on 
9 February 2010 its interest in investigating the 
recovery of uranium as a separate product from 
its sulphide ore body. The Talvivaara deposits com-
prise one of the largest known sulphide nickel re-
sources in Europe. The bioheapleaching technique 
developed for the deposits makes the extraction 
of metals from low grade ore economically viable. 
Therefore, in addition to nickel, zinc, copper, cobalt 
and uranium may be economically extracted and 
processed at the site. The company has submitted 
license applications according to the mining and 
nuclear energy legislation in order to recover urani-
um. The Basic Technical Characteristics (BTC) are 
already submitted to the European Commission, 
and the MBA code WTAL is assigned for the future 
uranium mine. The environmental impact assess-
ment was carried out in 2010; and the production 
of uranium products is expected to start during 
2011 if the licence application is granted.
This rapid progress has lead to several dis-
cussions and meetings concerning uranium ex-
ploration and mining in Finland. STUK and the 
geological Survey of Finland have participated in 
several mining related activities during 2010. The 
stakeholders and interest groups were invited to a 
uranium seminar held in Helsinki 10 September 
2010; and, the risks in uranium production and 
nuclear energy were discussed at another seminar 
in Kuopio 19–20 October 2010. STUK made strong 
contributions on these occasions. The uranium 
mining issues were widely discussed in the Finnish 
media during the whole year 2010.
Uranium in the nickel refinery
Norilsk Nickel operates the nickel refining plant at 
Harjavalta. The plant was commissioned in 1959, 
expanded in 1995 and again in 2002. Norilsk Nickel 
Finland became part of the Russian-based Norilsk 
Nickel as a result of the OM group’s nickel busi-
ness acquisition in 2007. Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta 
refinery employs a technique of sulfuric acid leach-
ing of nickel products. Norilsk Nickel aims to refine 
the Talvivaara nickel products. The uranium re-
siduals will be extracted from the nickel products. 
STUK granted a license to extract less than 10 tons 
of uranium in a year, which is less than the limit to 
be subject to nuclear energy legislation and inter-
national reporting in March 2010. The responsible 
manager and his deputy were approved by STUK 
in September. The Norilsk Nickel company submit-
ted the basic technical characteristics (BTC) to the 
European Commission in December 2010. The new 
MBA code for Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta is WNNH. 
Currently the uranium extracts are considered as 
waste, but the company is looking for customers for 
its planned uranium extracts and new products.
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3 Safeguards activities in 2010
3.1 The regulatory control of 
nuclear materials
The application of integrated safeguards began in 
Finland on 15 October 2008. Thus, in the year 
2009 the number of the IAEA inspections was re-
duced from approximately 25 person days to 15. 
Similarly, the European Commission reduced its 
inspection activities significantly. In 2010 the 
number of inspection days rose somewhat owing 
to first inspections at the geological repository site, 
additional inspection days at the Loviisa Nuclear 
Power Plant (NPP) and the increased number of 
random inspections in Finland. STUK continued 
with national safeguards measures as in the past. 
In 2010 the focus was on minor holders, which 
increased the number of inspection days of STUK. 
Nuclear material inventories at the end of 2010 
are shown in Tables 2 and 3 in Appendix 1. The 
development of inspections and inspection person 
days per Material Balance Area (MBA) is present-
ed in Figures 8 and 9. Inspections of STUK, the 
IAEA and the Commission in 2010 are presented 
in Appendix 2.
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3.1.1 Declarations and approvals of 
new international inspectors
All the relevant license holders sent their updated 
information for the national declaration, which is 
compiled by STUK, in time by 1 March 2010. STUK 
submitted Finland’s annual declaration updates to 
the IAEA on 15 May 2010 as required. Additionally, 
STUK submitted the quarterly declarations on ex-
ports in February, May, August and November.
In 2010, altogether 16 IAEA and 8 Commission 
new inspectors were approved to perform inspec-
tions at nuclear facilities in Finland.
3.1.2 The Loviisa nuclear power plant site
In 2010 STUK granted the operating company 
Fortum one import license for nuclear dual use 
items, i.e. instrumentation.
In 2010 the IAEA and the Commission spent a 
few additional inspection days at the Loviisa NPP 
site. Because the crane in the spent fuel storage 
failed during the 2009 physical inventory verifica-
tion (PIV) inspection on 6 October 2009, all of the 
fuel ponds could not be verified in 2009. The crane 
was repaired by 20 October 2009, but the re-in-
spection could not be scheduled earlier than 19–20 
January 2010. During the first inspection of the 
year 2010 new surveillance cameras were installed 
at the spent fuel storage. This allows changes and 
simplifications in the integrated safeguards ap-
proach for the Loviisa NPP in the future.
New fresh fuel was imported and transported to 
the facility in spring 2010. During the fuel transfer 
campaign at the facility, the IAEA carried out an 
unannounced inspection (UI) on 20 May 2010 in 
order to verify the ongoing fuel transfer activities 
between the different key measurement points 
(KMP). STUK participated in this inspection car-
ried out with only 2 hours notification. The IAEA 
expressed the need to update the design informa-
tion owing to the installation of new fuel racks and 
thus increased storage capacity of the spent fuel 
storage.
The refuelling and maintenance outage of the 
Loviisa 1 reactor unit took place in the period 
8 August – 2 September 2010, and that of the 
Loviisa 2 reactor unit in the period 4 September – 
13 November 2010. Owing to the new integrated 
safeguards approach for Finland, the IAEA and 
the Commission performed a pre-inspection with 
STUK before the outage, on 4–5 August 2010. 
Temporary surveillance cameras were installed 
in the reactor halls for the outage period, and re-
moved during the PIV carried out after the outage, 
on 19–20 October 2010. During the outage and 
before the closing of each reactor, STUK identi-
fied the fuel assemblies in the reactor cores and 
item counted the loading ponds. The Loviisa 1 core 
was inspected on 18 August 2010 and the Loviisa 
2 core on 3 October 2010. During the outage, the 
cask transfer was inspected on 11 September 2010 
by the IAEA and the Commission. In addition to 
the PIV and the core controls, STUK carried out 
two routine inspections and two measurement 
campaigns. The activities at the spent fuel storage 
facility were inspected twice.
At the Loviisa NPP STUK performed two non-
destructive assay (NDA) verification measurement 
campaigns on spent fuel elements in 2010. The first 
campaign, 4–5 May, was carried out with FORK 
equipment, which delivers a gross gamma signal 
from an ionisation chamber and a neutron count 
rate from a fission chamber. STUK’s FORK equip-
ment is sometimes referred to as eFORK (enhanced 
FORK), because it incorporates a CdZnTe-gamma 
spectrometer. During the previous measurements 
with the FORK detector in 2009, the detector was 
flooded due to missing O-rings. The measurements 
and tests in May showed that the device had not 
suffered any major damage. The only part found 
not to be in operating condition was one of two 
gross gamma detectors, and it is possible that this 
detector might have been inoperative prior to the 
flooding. The measurement system is based on 
measuring relative signals compared to known as-
semblies, so one malfunctioning detector increases 
the statistical errors in the measurement, but does 
not impact the absolute value of results. 21 as-
semblies and 2 dummies were successfully verified 
during this campaign.
The second NDA campaign, 18–19 November 
2010, was carried out with spent fuel attribute 
tester (SFAT) equipment with an HPge gam-
ma spectrometer. Traditionally, a SFAT device is 
equipped with a lower resolution NaI detector. This 
campaign had to be interrupted as the HPge spec-
trometer ran out of liquid nitrogen due to leaking 
vacuum. Prior to this, 26 fuel elements were veri-
fied. The verification results were archived in the 
STUK NDA measurement database developed for 
the purpose. The measurements and the environ-
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mental samples collected at the Loviisa NPP did 
not indicate any inconsistencies in the reporting by 
the operator.
On the basis of its own assessment as well as of 
IAEA and Commission inspection results, STUK 
concluded that Fortum’s Loviisa NPP has complied 
with its nuclear safeguards obligations in 2010.
3.1.3 The Olkiluoto nuclear power plant site
In 2010, STUK approved one new person to be 
appointed responsible for nuclear safeguards at 
the Olkiluoto NPP. During 2010 STUK also grant-
ed to the operating company TVO one export and 
fourteen import licences. These covered the export 
and import of end-of-life components to and from 
Sweden, and import of fresh nuclear fuel and nu-
clear dual use items, i.e. technology and instru-
mentation for the operating units and equipment 
to the new unit under construction.
Old superheaters, weighing in total about 700 
tonnes were transported by m/s Sigyn to Sweden, 
to be treated in Studsvik, Sweden in 2010 and 
2011. With Studsvik’s treatment concept it is usu-
ally possible to free release and recycle 80–90 per 
cent of the metals in the end-of-life components, 
which reduces both storage costs and environmen-
tal impact. Residual products from the treatment 
will be sent back to Finland for final storage. The 
transport of the heat exchangers to Sweden was 
inspected by STUK on 4 May 2010.
The refuelling and maintenance outage of the 
Olkiluoto 2 reactor unit took place in the period 
2–14 May 2010 and that of the Olkiluoto 1 reactor 
unit in the period 16 May – 12 June 2010. Similarly 
to the Loviisa NPP, the IAEA and the Commission 
performed a pre-inspection with STUK on 28 April 
2010, before the outage, and the PIV after the out-
age, 16–17 June 2010. The outage at Olkiluoto 1 
unit was the largest maintenance break in the 
facility’s history. It took 26 days to replace and 
upgrade turbines, coolant systems etc. The power 
output was increased with 25 MW.
During the refuelling and maintenance out-
age STUK identified the fuel assemblies in the 
reactor cores and verified and item counted the 
loading ponds before the reactors were closed. The 
Olkiluoto 2 reactor was inspected on 8 May 2010 
and the Olkiluoto 1 reactor on 6 June 2010. The 
outage and the core verification at Olkiluoto 2 were 
delayed for a day and a half owing to a failure in 
the fuel handling machine. The outage at Olkiluoto 
1 was well on time but there was a human identi-
fication error in the transfer of fresh fuel elements 
from the storage to the reactor hall pool. The error 
was recognised before the loading of the reactor 
itself, but some delay took place owing to the fact 
that correct individual fuel assemblies had to be 
transferred from the fresh fuel storage.
The IAEA random interim inspections to 
Finland were addressed to the Olkiluoto NPP: on 
24 February to the Olkiluoto 1 unit, on 18 August 
to the spent fuel storage, and on 28 October again 
to the spent fuel storage. STUK carried out two 
additional routine inspections for the Olkiluoto 
site and the material balance areas (MBA) at the 
Olkiluoto NPP.
At the Olkiluoto NPP STUK performed two non-
destructive assay (NDA) verification measurement 
campaigns on spent fuel elements in 2010: 14–16 
June and 29 November to 1 December. During 
both of the campaigns STUK performed gamma 
Burnup Verification (gBUV) measurements at the 
Olkiluoto spent fuel storage. Altogether 65 spent 
fuel assemblies were verified. The results were ar-
chived in the mobile version of the NDA measure-
ment database.
The measurement campaigns were concentrat-
ed on the spent fuel storage since it is expected 
that the construction of the spent fuel storage 
enlargement will limit the measurement access to 
spent fuel in the storage in coming years. Thus, to 
offset this, these assemblies are the target of most 
measurement campaigns at Olkiluoto prior to this.
The construction of the new Olkiluoto 3 reactor 
(OL-3) has proceeded to such a stage that nuclear 
Figure 10. Inspection of the transport of superheaters 
to Sweden for treatment.
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items are to be imported to the site. The turbine 
hall with its instrumentation proceeds well, but 
the reactor building is delayed. However, the main 
components are under manufactory, assembly and 
STUK’s regulatory control. TVO prepared a draft 
for the basic technical characteristics (BTC) of the 
new unit in 2008. This first BTC was reviewed by 
STUK, the IAEA, and the Commission twice in 
2008. Thus, the inspectorates have the possibility 
to plan the surveillance and containment meas-
ures in advance. Future actions were, during 2009, 
waiting for the advancement of the construction 
of the fuel handling buildings. The IAEA and the 
Commission visited the OL-3 construction site on 
3 March 2010 to adjust containment and surveil-
lance instrumentation on site. The locations of 
cameras and control units were agreed to for the 
reactor building. The fuel handling systems were 
still heavily under construction and thus the loca-
tions of cameras and control units could not yet 
be determined for the fuel handling building. The 
final BTC is due at least 200 days before the first 
consignment of nuclear material is to be received. 
The commissioning of the OL-3 unit is postponed 
until 2013.
The spent fuel storage building at the Olkiluoto 
NPP will be enlarged to have capacity for the spent 
fuel of the future. New ponds will be constructed 
for fuel assemblies from the operating reactors 
and from that under construction. The IAEA and 
the Commission inspectors reviewed the plans and 
visited the spent fuel storage on 2 March 2010, in 
order to plan containment and surveillance meas-
ures during and after the enlargement of the stor-
age building. No new access routes will be made 
to the building. During the enlargement and also 
during future operation, the existing surveillance 
is expected to cover accurately the whole enlarge-
ment area of the storage.
On the basis of its own assessment as well as 
IAEA and Commission inspection results, STUK 
concluded that TVO’s Olkiluoto NPP has complied 
with its nuclear safeguards obligations in 2010.
3.1.4 The VTT FiR1 research reactor site
In 2010 STUK carried out two interim inspections 
to the VTT research rector site. The site declara-
tion and activities and internal control systems 
were reviewed on 9 March. Safeguards inspectors 
from STUK and the European Commission verified 
the nuclear material inventory of VTT on 2 June 
2010. There were some inconsistencies in reporting 
but the nuclear material inventory was concluded 
to be correct. As follow-up actions STUK remarked 
that the operator shall update the nuclear materi-
als handbook to cover the bookkeeping and report-
ing of nuclear items and equipment. The reporting 
of unreported graphite pins to STUK and update of 
the basic technical characteristics (BTC) to STUK 
and the Commission were requested. The follow-up 
interim inspection was carried out on 12 October 
2010 to clarify remarks made during previous in-
spections.
On the basis of its own assessment as well as 
IAEA and Commission inspection results, STUK 
concluded that the VTT FiR1 operator has com-
plied with its nuclear safeguards obligations in 
2010.
3.1.5 The STUK site
Safeguards inspectors from STUK and the 
European Commission and the IAEA verified the 
nuclear material inventory of STUK on 1 June 
2010. Additionally, the IAEA carried out comple-
mentary access to the STUK site in order to clarify 
the site boundaries and some activities at the re-
search department. There where some changes in 
companies located in the non-STUK premises of 
the STUK building. A surveying company had left 
the building a few years ago and the new Nuclide 
Analytics Company (Suomen Nuklidianalytiikka) 
is present near STUK laboratories. This company 
is founded and operated by a former STUK staff 
member.
Organisational questions at the operator were 
remarked. Owing to outsourcing of staff and ac-
tivities at the national waste receiving station of 
STUK, the responsibilities and boundaries at the 
operator were not clearly indicated. STUK has nu-
clear material at a few locations outside of the site, 
not only at the Central Storage at Olkiluoto NPP 
as declared. These additional locations should be 
reported as clearly defined KMPs. Thus, the need 
to update the BTC was indicated.
The physical inventory verification was com-
pleted at the storage located in Olkiluoto on 15 
June 2010 in conjunction to the PIV inspection to 
the Olkiluoto NPP. The operator was presented 
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by the nuclear materials inspector. The STUK 
Nuclear Materials Section has approved the person 
responsible for the nuclear material accountancy 
and control at STUK, but the requirement to have 
a deputy approved is not fulfilled at STUK owing 
to outsourcing. This internal organisational ques-
tion is to be solved.
3.1.6 The University of Helsinki site
Safeguards inspectors from STUK and the 
European Commission verified the nuclear mate-
rial inventory of the University of Helsinki on 3 
June 2010. There were some rounding and timing 
inconsistencies in reporting but the nuclear mate-
rial inventory at the Laboratory of Radiochemistry 
was concluded to be correct. STUK remarked that 
the operator shall update the reporting of nuclear 
materials and the basic technical characteristics 
(BTC). This was done by the operator in June as 
requested.
On the basis of its assessment and inspection 
results, STUK concluded that the University of 
Helsinki has complied with its nuclear safeguards 
obligations in 2010.
3.17 Minor nuclear material holders
In 2010 several STUK inspections were focused 
on the minor holders in order to assure that the 
capabilities and procedures are adequate. STUK 
inspected the reports from the minor nuclear ma-
terial holders. The international inspectorates did 
not make other types of inspections to the minor 
holders.
On the basis of its assessment and inspection 
results, STUK concluded that the minor nuclear 
material holders have complied with their nuclear 
safeguards obligations in 2010.
3.1.8 New stakeholders
In 2010 STUK granted an operation license to 
Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta for producing, storing 
and handling uranium as a by-product of the nick-
el purification process for an annual amount of 
less than 10 metric tons. STUK also approved one 
person and a deputy to be appointed responsible 
for nuclear safeguards at the facility.
3.1.9 The final disposal facility site 
for spent nuclear fuel
In 2010 the geological repository site was declared 
within article 2a(iii) of the Additional Protocol. 
Previously, the Onkalo project for the final dis-
posal of spent nuclear fuel had been declared with-
in article 2a(x) of the Additional Protocol to the 
Safeguards Agreement since the entry-in-force of 
the Protocol in 2004. The Commission assigned the 
Material Balance Area (MBA) code W0LF to Onkalo 
in January 2008. Following the development of 
the Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) at the 
IAEA in 2008 for the encapsulation plant and the 
geological repository, the Commission prepared the 
Annex H-I of the safeguards regulation – adopted 
for the geological repository – for the basic techni-
cal characteristics (BTC) in 2009. Consequently, in 
2009 STUK forwarded the BTC prepared by Posiva 
to the Commission. In 2010 Posiva provided an up-
date of the BTC document. Additionally, the Posiva 
site was declared, for the first time, under article 
2a(iii) in Finland’s annual declaration in 2010, in 
order to facilitate the IAEA integrated safeguards 
approaches.
Posiva updated its non-proliferation handbook 
in March 2010 to clarify and update the descrip-
tions of some of Posiva’s safeguards practices. 
However, this update did not consider the need 
to prepare the early Design Information and the 
Site Declaration as indicated by the IAEA and 
the Commission. Therefore, the update was not 
accepted by STUK, and a renewed version was 
requested.
During the year 2010 STUK carried out three 
interim inspections to the underground premises 
of the final disposal facility. The IAEA joined one 
of these by means of Complementary Access. A 
Euratom inspector was also present during the in-
spection at the Olkiluoto site. The IAEA inspected 
the underground premises, the shaft and the ven-
tilation technology building where there will be 
access routes to the underground premises.
Several meetings were arranged between the 
Finnish and Swedish authorities and operators, the 
Commission and the IAEA during the year 2009 in 
order to clarify and facilitate safeguards measures 
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for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. This Six-
Party communication was continued in a meeting 
arranged at Olkiluoto on 23–24 November 2010. 
This meeting was focused on the verification issues 
prior to spent fuel encapsulation.
3.1.10 Nuclear dual use items, export licenses
In 2010 the Ministry for Foreign Affairs issued 
four licences for exporting nuclear process model-
ling software to the Russian Federation, People’s 
Republic of China, Slovenia and Slovakia. STUK 
issued the license to export and import end-of-life 
components to Sweden.
3.1.11 Transport of nuclear materials
In 2010, fresh nuclear fuel was imported to Finland 
from Spain, Sweden and the Russian Federation 
(Table 1). In relation to these imports, STUK ap-
proved three transport plans and inspected one 
transport of fresh nuclear fuel. Furthermore, STUK 
approved one package design for a package to be 
used in transports of fissile material.
3.1.12 International transfers of 
nuclear material
In 2010, TVO reported to STUK about its inter-
national fuel contracts, fuel transfers and fuel 
shipments. STUK carried out an on-site inspec-
tion where TVO’s nuclear material accountancy 
on the fresh fuel imported in 2010 was verified 
against the original shipment documents cover-
ing the international transfers. The accountancy 
of the natural uranium in TVO’s possession but 
stored outside of the Olkiluoto NPP site was also 
inspected. Based on the findings, STUK concluded 
that TVO has complied with its safeguards obliga-
tions in purchasing the nuclear fuel and managing 
its international transfers.
3.1.13 Incidents in 2010
A high-enriched uranium contaminated metal item 
was detected in Finland in the spring of 2010, 
within a scrap metal shipment from abroad. The 
origin and composition of the contaminated metal 
item was under investigations during the year. The 
Joint Research Centre, Institute of Transuranium 
Elements (JRC-ITU) in Karlsruhe assisted in the 
investigations. It was concluded that the item has 
to be taken into the possession of the state.
The export control of dual-use equipment is a 
growing global challenge. The expansion of nuclear 
energy to new states gives possibilities to expand 
international trade. This was demonstrated in 
the summer of 2010 as the international press 
discussed the effects of the Stuxnet worm at the 
Iranian nuclear power plant. The virus affected 
the control systems for components manufactured 
by a Finnish company. The export licensing that 
had taken place in the past was reviewed by the 
Finnish authorities.
3.2 International developments 
in safeguards
In the international nuclear safeguards develop-
ment fora, the major topics during the year 2010 
were the successes in the NTP review conference 
and that in the IAEA safeguards symposium. The 
advances in disarmament and efficiency in safe-
guarding new facilities were addressed. The roles, 
responsibilities and practices of the three levels 
of safeguards in place within the EU – those of 
the IAEA, those of the European Commission and 
those of the EU Member States – were discussed in 
a constructive atmosphere, with the objective of en-
hancing cooperation and improving cost efficiency. 
The event was described as one of the themes of the 
year. STUK contribution can be found in Chapter 2 
and in several references in Chapter 6.
STUK contributed to the work of IAEA’s 
Standing Advisory group on Safeguards Im plem-
entation (SAgSI) in 2010 by having a member in 
SAgSI. Safeguards implementation issues consid-
ered by SAgSI during the year included Integrated 
Safeguards issues, furthering the state level safe-
guards concept, cooperation with State Systems of 
Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials 
(SSAC), strategic planning, future Safeguards Im-
plementation Report, and a safeguards R&D plan.
The European Nuclear Society (ENS) organised 
a conference in June in Barcelona. Safeguards-
related topics were included in the programme. At 
the conference STUK gave the presentation “A se-
lection of recent achievements and future challeng-
es in safeguards R&D as identified by the ESARDA” 
on behalf of the European Safeguards Research 
and Development Association’s (ESARDA).
In 2010 STUK continued its participation in the 
ESARDA working groups and the steering commit-
tee meeting. During 2010 STUK’s representative 
continued her two-year term as the President of 
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ESARDA. Thus, STUK had strong influence in the 
ESARDA Executive Board and via ESARDA also 
at the INMM and IAEA conferences. The head of 
STUK’s Security Technology Laboratory started 
his term as chairperson of the ESARDA Novel 
Technologies/Novel Approaches (NA/NA) Working 
group.
In 2010, the group of experts for Application of 
Safeguards to geological Repositories (ASTOR) 
met at the Joint Research Centre in Ispra in 
November. Novel technologies to be applied for 
safeguards purposes at this new type of facility 
were presented and discussed during the meeting. 
In addition to the repository safeguards, verifica-
tion of spent nuclear fuel prior to disposal was 
addressed. One multilateral meeting between the 
IAEA, the European Commission, Finland, and 
Sweden on the implementation of safeguards for 
geological repositories was held in Olkiluoto 23–24 
November. Several observers participated in this 
Six-Party meeting.
The Nordic symposium on non-proliferation is-
sues was arranged by STUK at Naantali SPA 21–
22 April 2010. The topics covered the main devel-
opments in the field of safeguards: current strate-
gies and policies at the IAEA and the Commission, 
experiences from the implementation of integrated 
safeguards in the Nordic countries, the integra-
tion of nuclear security and safeguards, nuclear 
disarmament and expectations for the coming NPT 
review conference. Unfortunately, air traffic was 
blocked during those days by the ash cloud origi-
nating from the Eyjafjallajökull volcano on Iceland. 
This reduced the number of participants from the 
traditional 50 to only 20. Those who could make the 
trip via road, rail or sea enjoyed the co-operative 
atmosphere with several remote presentations.
3.3 Bilateral cooperation and 
peer-to-peer exchanges 
strengthen regional security
Finland’s bilateral cooperation programmes in the 
area of non-proliferation are directed mainly to-
wards our neighbouring countries outside the EU 
and are motivated by the continued need for en-
hancement of the regional security environment. 
Accordingly, STUK continued its cooperation pro-
gramme with the Russian Federation. The focus 
in 2010 was on the cooperation with the Russian 
nuclear security and safeguards authorities, main-
ly through peer-to-peer exchanges. Collaboration 
with Ukraine in mutually beneficial areas was re-
established in 2008 and an agreement about a 
programme was made between the State Nuclear 
Regulatory Committee of Ukraine (SNRCU) and 
STUK. The focus in 2009–2010 was on the con-
struction of the Mobile Measurement Laboratory 
to be used by SNRCU.
3.3.1 Cooperation with the 
Rostechnadzor, Russia
Cooperation between Finnish and Russian authori-
ties, technical support organisations and industrial 
partners included two workshops in the area of 
regulatory supervision of accountancy, control and 
protection of nuclear and other radioactive materi-
als. Representatives of Rostechnadzor and Moscow 
RADON visited STUK and the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant (NPP) site to get acquainted with the 
TVO and Posiva projects and particularly with the 
handling and control of nuclear and radioactive 
waste.
The demonstration of the spent fuel attri-
bute tester (SFAT) measurement device for the 
Rostechnadzor was successfully carried out 
in November 2008 at the Kola nuclear power 
plant. The device was returned, as planned, to the 
Security Technology Laboratory at STUK and was 
tested and prepared for shipment to the Ozersk 
Office of the Rostechnadzor in 2009. During 2010 
a new computer was obtained for the system and 
software installed accordingly. Steps were taken 
to organize the shipment in 2011. This bilateral 
work complements the work done within the EU-
financed TACIS project aiming at improving the 
control of the handling of nuclear material at 
Mayak reprocessing plant. The first part of this EU 
project was completed in 2010; the second will be 
completed in 2011.
Finnish and Russian Customs Authorities met 
in St. Petersburg and in Helsinki in June and 
December 2010. As a result, it was decided to con-
tinue with the joint customs training activities 
during 2011. The possibility to organize specific ex-
ercises aimed at CBRN protection of the fast train 
Allegro that started its operation between Helsinki 
and St. Petersburg in December 2010 was also 
discussed.
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3.3.2 The programme with Ukraine: 
delivery of the mobile laboratory
During 2009 the focus was on manufacturing and 
delivering a Mobile Laboratory vehicle for the 
use of the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee 
of Ukraine (SNRCU). Subsequently, by the end 
of that year, the experts from the IAEA, Ukraine, 
Sweden, and the European Commission were get-
ting acquainted with its technical, functional and 
operative features at STUK. The mobile measur-
ing laboratory: Sophisticated ON-site Nuclide 
Identification (SONNI) enables identifying and 
analysing radioactive sources and nuclear mate-
rials in the environment, at industrial facilities 
and in cases of threatening situations. The labora-
tory includes measuring, sampling, positioning and 
communication systems. Data can be transmitted 
in real time to the control centre, where the data 
may be entered into a map system, thus providing 
real-time information for the management of the 
operations. At locations where the vehicle cannot 
have access, a portable (rucksack) application with 
the same functionality can be used. This additional 
capacity and functionality will significantly extend 
the usefulness of this monitoring vehicle.
The top-modern radiation measuring vehicle 
with the portable application unit was donated 
to the IAEA. The vehicle started its journey from 
STUK on Monday, 12 April 2010 and arrived via 
the IAEA to the SNRCU in Kiev on 14 December 
2010. Both units are based on proven technology, 
demonstrated by STUK through their years long 
routine use.
STUK also participated in the tasks of the coop-
eration programme between the Swedish Radiation 
Safety Authority (SSM) and the Ukraine authori-
ties including the SNRCU. Experts from STUK 
participated in the review and development of the 
national system of nuclear material accountancy 
and control and in the non-proliferation regime 
including the nuclear fuel cycle related activities 
in Ukraine.
3.4 The Finnish National Data 
Centre for the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
3.4.1 International cooperation is the 
foundation of CTBT verification
During 2010 the Finnish National Data Centre 
(FiNDC) participated in meetings of the Working 
group B (WgB) of the Preparatory Commission 
for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization (CTBTO). WgB is a policy making 
organ for the technical development of the veri-
fication regime. By participating in the work of 
WgB and its subsidiaries (workshops and expert 
groups), the FiNDC can provide technical expertise 
to the CTBTO, while also attending to the Finnish 
national interests.
3.4.2 The analysis pipeline is a well 
established daily routine
The FiNDC continued developing its own routine 
monitoring system for the data received from the 
International Monitoring System’s network (IMS). 
The FiNDC routinely analyses all radionuclide 
measurement data generated at the IMS radionu-
clide stations across the world. The IMS network 
is still developing, and the number of operational 
air filter stations was about 60 at the end of 2010 
(at the final stage there will be 80). The operation-
al stations generated approximately 700 gamma 
spectra per day for the FiNDC analysis pipeline 
to handle. The analysis pipeline is linked to the 
LINSSI database and equipped with an automated 
alarm system, to enable efficient and fully auto-
mated screening of the data.
Figure 11. The mobile measuring laboratory finally in 
Kiev with Mr. Moore of the IAEA and Mr. Rautjärvi of 
STUK.
STUK-B 128
31
The number of IMS stations equipped with xe-
non measurement capabilities was 26 at the end 
of 2010. The first IMS xenon system gained CTBT 
certification in 2010 (RNx75, Charlottesville, USA). 
During the year FiNDC developed its capabilities 
to receive and analyse Ng data and now all Ng 
data is analysed at the FiNDC and stored in the 
databases alongside with analysis results provided 
by the International Data Centre (IDC). xenon 
measurements are especially important for CTBT 
verification, because xenon, as a noble gas, often 
leaks also from underground tests, which seldom 
release particulate matter.
3.4.3 An interesting alarm
In May 2010 FiNDC detected a signal of radionu-
clide particles with very high CTBT relevance in 
spectra from two stations situated close to each 
other. As FiNDC analyses also preliminary spectra 
that are sent from the stations during measure-
ments, it was among the first ones to pick up the 
signal, almost a whole day before even prelimi-
nary results from the International Data Centre 
where available. FiNDC delivered status reports 
to its collaborators and cooperated internationally 
to resolve the situation. Despite extensive inter-
national co-operation, the source of the release is 
still unknown, but further analysis of the data has 
shown that it is not consistent with any probable 
release scenario from a nuclear test. As the seismic 
network did not detect any indications of testing in 
the area at that time, it is safe to conclude that this 
was a false alarm.
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4 Human resources development
Nuclear safeguards by the Nuclear Materials 
Section of STUK cover all typical measures of a 
State System of Accounting for and Control of 
Nuclear Materials (SSAC), and many other activi-
ties besides. The nuclear fuel cycle related activi-
ties, e.g. research and development activities not 
involving nuclear material and manufacture of cer-
tain equipment as defined it the Additional Protocol 
(AP) have enlarged the scope of traditional safe-
guards. Nuclear safeguards on the national level 
are closely linked with other functions of nuclear 
materials control and non-proliferation: licensing, 
export control, border control, transport control, 
combating illicit trafficking, the physical protection 
of nuclear materials, and monitoring compliance 
with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT). Continuous analysis of the developments 
in the involved fields of both technology and poli-
tics is a daily, multidisciplinary task at the STUK 
Nuclear Materials Section.
The personnel’s competence is systematically 
developed taking into account the needs of the 
organisation and the wishes of the individuals (see 
Figure 12). Those aiming at an expert’s career are 
valued as highly as those interested in manage-
rial duties. At the Nuclear Materials Section, the 
management participated in the general course for 
managers at government organisations provided 
by the Finnish Institute of Public Management. 
The internal training programme of the section 
continued, and experts participated in a few inter-
national courses. During 2010 the main focus was 
in nuclear forensics and security related training 
courses. One of the staff members participated 
in the 1-week ESARDA safeguards course at the 
Joint Research Centre at Ispra, Italy and in the 
5-week national course for nuclear safety.
Competences were improved considerably in 
2010. Anna Lahkola defended her PhD thesis 
on 4 June 2010 at Tampere University. Antero 
Kuusi graduated from Aalto University School 
of Technology and was appointed as inspector. 
The RADAR project to educate and train Finnish 
Customs officers benefited from the co-operation 
established with the Joint Research Centre. During 
2010 the supervisors of the Finnish Customs were 
educated at JRC Ispra. Moreover, Suvi Lehtinen 
was employed as trainee during the summer to 
assist the instrumentation at the border control 
stations.
The internal training programme of safeguards 
inspectors at STUK continued in 2010. There 
were two seminar lectures arranged at STUK. 
The first concerned the international transfers of 
nuclear material and the second was about STUK’s 
licensing procedure regarding nuclear material. 
Moreover, one seminar also concentrated on cur-
rent issues of nuclear non-proliferation and was 
held in cooperation with the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs and the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy.
The Nuclear Materials Section has emergency 
preparedness responsibilities as part of the com-
mon preparedness system of STUK. The Nuclear 
Materials Section is the main responsible sec-
tion inside STUK in response to those safety and 
security related incidents that involve nuclear 
materials and are not in purview of the Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation, which has responsibility for all 
incidents in nuclear power plants and the research 
reactor. New internal guidance for handling these 
incidents was finalised in 2010, which will help the 
response to any future incidents.
In addition to being the responsible section 
for the above cases, the personnel of the Nuclear 
Materials Section assist other sections in response 
to any incidents that may include nuclear materi-
als or require their expertise for any other reason. 
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The staff of STUK Nuclear Materials Section. All section staff participate in the core safeguards tasks.  
Additionally, each person has some special areas of expertise to focus on. 
Mr. Timo Ansaranta Inspector Control of competence at facilities and at small holders
Ms. Ritva Kylmälä Assistant 
Mr. Marko Hämäläinen Senior Inspector Inspection coordination, handbooks, Additional Protocol implementation
Ms. Anna Lahkola Senior Inspector Transport of nuclear materials, central accountancy
Mr. Tapani Honkamaa Senior Inspector Non-destructive assay, FINSP to the IAEA safeguards
Mr. Antero Kuusi Inspector Databases, non-destructive assay
Ms. Elina Martikka Section Head Management
Mr. Olli Okko Senior Inspector Safeguards of research and development, final disposal
Mr. Mikael Moring Senior Inspector Finnish National Data Centre for the CTBT, non-destructive assay, 
environmental sampling
Mr. Tero Varjoranta Director Resourcing until July 2010
Mr. Risto Paltemaa Director Resourcing, Management
Ms. Arja Tanninen Deputy Director Licensing, permits
 
Figure 12. The staff of Nuclear Materials Section.
Some of the Nuclear Materials Section staff are 
also part of the pool of Experts-on-Duty, who re-
ceive the notifications for incidents and are respon-
sible for initiating the STUK response. The urgent 
fax and telephone system of the preparedness 
system is also used to transfer the information 
about a short notice IAEA inspection rapidly to the 
Nuclear Materials Section.
In April STUK replaced the traditional office 
telephones by mobile phones. However, the tradi-
tional telephone numbers remained during office 
hours, if so desired by the employee. A few wired 
telephone and fax lines remained for parallel use. 
This improves the availability of the staff, but the 
arrangement may initially confuse the license hold-
ers, partners, customers and other stakeholders.
34
STUK-B 128
5 Conclusions
The implementation of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) integrated safeguards be-
gan in Finland on 15 October 2008. Thus, the year 
2009 was the first whole year with the new ap-
proach. The number of IAEA inspection days was 
reduced from the approximately 25 person days 
per year of the past to 13. Similarly, the European 
Commission reduced its inspection activities to 14. 
STUK continued with national safeguards meas-
ures and activities with 64 inspection days and 
40 inspections. In order to be present at the short 
notice IAEA inspections, agreed to compensate for 
the reduced number of routine inspections, STUK 
raised preparedness to have a daily on-the-alert 
inspector. In 2010 the number of the inspection 
days of the international organisations was some-
what higher than in 2009, because a few issues 
remained from the previous year and because of 
the raised number on random interim inspections 
in 2010.
In 2010 STUK performed 27 safeguards inspec-
tions at the Finnish nuclear power plants (NPP), 
ten at the Loviisa NPP and 17 at the Olkiluoto 
NPP. The Commission and the IAEA took part in 
19 of these inspections. STUK performed four non-
destructive assay measurement campaigns, two at 
the Loviisa NPP and two at the Olkiluoto NPP. At 
other facilities, STUK performed four safeguards 
inspections, of which the Commission took part in 
the physical inventory verification at the VTT re-
search reactor. At the geological repository of spent 
nuclear fuel, the IAEA and the Euratom carried 
out first inspections. The IAEA carried out comple-
mentary access to the STUK site and to the geo-
logical repository site to verify declared activities 
and the absence of undeclared activities. The IAEA 
sent its safeguards statements to the Commission, 
which amended them with its own conclusions and 
forwarded them to STUK. The conclusions by the 
Commission were in line with the IAEA’s remarks 
as well as STUK’s findings; there were no out-
standing questions by the IAEA or the Commission 
at the end of 2010.
The results of STUK’s nuclear safeguards in-
spection activities continued to demonstrate that 
the Finnish licence holders take good care of their 
nuclear materials. There were no indications of un-
declared materials or activities and the inspected 
materials and activities were in accordance with 
the licence holders’ declarations. Two license hold-
ers’ organisational safeguards procedures were 
remarked at. After the outsourcing at STUK the 
responsibilities at the operator were not in compli-
ance with the national requirements. Neither the 
IAEA nor the Commission made any remarks nor 
did they present any required actions based on 
their inspections. By their nuclear materials ac-
countancy and control systems, all license holders 
enabled STUK to fulfil its own obligations under 
the international agreements relevant to nuclear 
safeguards and non-proliferation.
The purpose of the Finnish chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) Task Force is to 
advance measures to deter, prevent, detect and 
respond to illicit CBRN activities, and to enhance 
coordination and cooperation between national 
authorities involved in the counter-CBRN effort. In 
2010 STUK Nuclear Materials Section cooperated 
closely with the Finnish Customs to offer expert 
advice in development of radiation monitoring at 
borders, including training for Customs officers.
A major goal of all current Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) related activities 
is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. To reach 
this goal, major steps have to be taken in the politi-
cal arena, and an important prerequisite for posi-
tive political action is that the verification system 
of the CTBTO is functioning and able to provide 
assurance to all parties that it is impossible to 
make a clandestine nuclear test without getting 
detected. The FiNDC is committed to its own role 
in the common endeavour so that the verification 
system of the CTBTO can accomplish its detection 
task. While still incomplete, the verification system 
has already demonstrated its potential for detect-
ing nuclear tests.
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7 Abbreviations and acronyms
ADR
European Agreement con-
cerning the International 
Carriage of Dangerous goods 
by Road
AP
Additional Protocol to the 
Safeguards Agreement
AQG
Atomic Questions group of 
the Council of the European 
Union
ASTOR
Application of Safeguards to 
geological Repositories
BTC
Basic Technical 
Characteristics
CA
Complementary Access
CBRN
Chemical, biological, radio-
logical and nuclear (such as 
in “protective measures taken 
against CBRN weapons or 
hazards”)
CdZnTe
Cadmium zinc telluride
CTBT
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty
CTBTO
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty Organization
DIQ
Design Information 
Questionnaire
DIV
Design Information 
Verification
DU
Depleted uranium
eFORK
enhanced FORK with a 
CdZnTe-gamma spectrometer 
(see FORK)
ES
Environmental Sampling
ESARDA
European Safeguards 
Research and Development 
Association
EU
European Union
FA
(1) Facility Attachment ac-
cording to the Safeguards 
Agreement (INFCIRC/193), 
(2) Fuel Assembly
FiNDC
Finnish National Data 
Centre for the CTBT
FINSP
Finnish Support Programme 
to the IAEA Safeguards
FORK
Spent fuel verifier with gross 
gamma and neutron detec-
tion
GBUV
gamma Burnup Verifier
GICNT
global Initiative for 
Combating Nuclear 
Terrorism
HEU
High-enriched uranium
HPGe
High-Purity germanium
IAEA
International Atomic Energy 
Agency
IMS
International Monitoring 
System (of the CTBTO)
ITU
Institute of Transuranium 
Elements in Karlsruhe
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INFCIRC
Information Circular 
(IAEA document type, eg. 
INFCIRC/193, Safeguards 
Agreement, or INFCIRC/140, 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty)
IPPAS
International Physical 
Protection Advisory Service
IS
Integrated Safeguards
ISSAS
International SSAC Advisory 
Service
ITWG
International Technical 
Working group for combating 
illicit trafficking of nuclear 
and other radioactive materi-
als
JRC
The Joint Research Centre
KMP
Key Measurement Point
LEU
Low-enriched uranium
LINSSI
an SQL database for gamma-
ray spectrometry
MBA
Material Balance Area
MEE
Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy
MFA
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
NDA
Non-Destructive Assay
NM
Nuclear Material
NPP
Nuclear Power Plant
NPT
The Treaty on the Non-
proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (INFCIRC/140, 
“Non-Proliferation Treaty”)
NSG
Nuclear Suppliers’ group
Onkalo
Underground rock character-
isation facility (for the final 
disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel)
PIV
Physical Inventory 
Verification
PSP
Particular Safeguards 
Provisions
PTS
Provisional Technical 
Secretariat (to the 
Preparatory Commission of 
the CTBT)
Pu
Plutonium
RL07
Radionuclide Laboratory to 
the CTBT hosted by STUK 
(FIL07)
SA
Subsidiary Arrangements
SAGSI
Standing Advisory group on 
Safeguards Implementation
SFAT
Spent Fuel Attribute Tester
SNRCU
State Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission of Ukraine
SNRI
Short Notice Random 
Inspection
SNUICA
Short notice, unannounced 
inspection, complementary 
access on-alert inspector
SSAC
State System of Accounting 
for and Control of Nuclear 
Materials
SSM
Swedish Radiation Safety 
Authority
Th
Thorium
U
Uranium
UI
Unannounced Inspection
UNSC
United Nations Security 
Council
VTT
Technical Research Centre of 
Finland
WGB
Working group B (of the 
CTBTO)
STUK-B 128
39
Table 1. Summary of nuclear material receipts and shipments in 2010.
To From FA LEU (kg) Pu (kg)
W0L1 Spain 100 17 695 –
W0L2 (1/2) Sweden 58 10 027 –
W0L2 (2/2) Sweden 60 10 359 –
W0LS W0L1 40 6 612 58
W0LS W0L1 40 6 611 58
W0LS W0L1 40 6 606 58
W0LS W0L1 40 6 608 58
W0LS W0L2 41 6 881 61
W0LS W0L2 41 6 868 61
W0LS W0L2 41 6 855 61
W0LS W0L2 41 6 865 61
W0LS W0L2 41 6 848 61
W0LS W0L2 41 6 850 61
WL0V (1/2) Russian Federation 90 11 363 –
WL0V (1/2) Russian Federation 90 11 357 –
 W0L1, W0L2 & W0LS = Olkiluoto NPP, WL0V = Loviisa NPP, FA = fuel assembly; LEU = low-enriched uranium, Pu = plutonium.  
 Note: W0L1 and W0L2 shipments are marked only once into the table as W0LS receipts.
APPENDIX 1 Nuclear materials in Finland in 2010
Table 2. Fuel assemblies at 31 December 2010.
MBA FA/SFA *) LEU (kg) Pu (kg)
W0L1 1 022/444 175 556 676
W0L2 1 005/433 167 702 625
W0LS 6 556/6 556 1 110 318 9 306
WL0V 4 851/4 171 561 874 5 075
MBA = material balance area, FA = fuel assembly, SFA = spent fuel assembly
*) FAs in core are accounted as fresh fuel assemblies  
(Loviisa NPP 313 FAs and Olkiluoto NPP 500 FAs per reactor)
Table 3. Total amounts of nuclear material at 31 December 2010.
MBA Natural U (kg) Enriched U* (kg) Depleted U (kg) Plutonium (kg) Thorium (kg)
W0L1 – 175 771 – 677 –
W0L2 – 167 742 – 626 –
W0LS – 1 110 318 – 9 306 –
WL0V – 561 875 – 5 075 –
WRRF 1 511 60.087 0.002 < 0.001 –
WFRS
WFRS *
0.170 
(44.508)
0.536 
(0.888)
12.952 
(1 010)
– 
(0.003)
– 
(2.5)
WKK0 2 599 – – – –
WHEL 41.225 0.290 20.010 0.003 2.994
Minor holders  0.2 0.00116  1146.3 ~ 0  0.163
MBA = material balance area, WRRF = VTT FiR-1/VTT Processes, WFRS = STUK, WKK0 = OMG Kokkola Chemicals, WHEL =  Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the 
University of Helsinki, U = uranium. *) Less than 150 g of high-enriched uranium, mainly used in detectors.
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APPENDIX 2 Safeguards field activities in 2010
General information Inspections Inspection  person days
MBA Date Inspection type IAEA COM STUK IAEA COM STUK
WL0V 19–20 January PIV completion 1 1 1 2 2 2
W0L1 24 February SNRI 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0LF 2 March As built DIV 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0L2, W0LS 
Olkiluoto site 2 March Interim Inspection 0 0 2 0 0 1
WRRF 9 March Nuclear Materials and site 0 0 1 0 0 2
WL0V 11 March Interim Inspection + site verification 0 0 1 0 0 1
Dekra 16 March PIV 0 0 1 0 0 1
GTK 17 March PIV 0 0 1 0 0 1
Oxford Instruments 17 March PIV 0 0 1 0 0 1
Finnair 18 March PIV 0 0 1 0 0 1
HYRL 31March PIV + site verification 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0L1, W0L2 28 April pre-PIT 2 2 2 2 2 2
WL0V 28 April Inspection of SFA 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0L2 8 May Core Verification 0 0 1 0 0 1
WL0V 20 May UI 1 0 1 1 0 1
WFRS 1 June PIV 1 1 1 1 1 2
SSFSTUK (WFRS) 1 June Complementary Access (2 h) 1 1 1 1 1 2
WRRF 2 June PIV 0 1 1 0 1 1
WHEL 3 June PIV 0 1 1 0 1 1
W0L1 6 June Core Verification 0 0 1 0 0 1
SSFP0SI 15 June Complementary Access 1 0 1 1 0 1
W0LF 15 June As built DIV 0 0 1 0 0 1
WFRS Olkiluoto 15 June PIV, KMP B in Olkiluoto 1 1 1 1 1 2
W0L1,W0L2, W0LS 16–17 June PIV 3 3 3 3 3 3
WL0V 6 July Interim Inspection 0 0 1 0 0 1
WL0V 4–5 August Pre-PIT 1 1 1 2 2 2
WL0V 17 August Lo1 Core Verification 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0LS 18  August SNRI 1 1 1 1 1 1
WL0V 11 September Cask transfer from Lo2 1 1 1 1 1 1
TVO Helsinki Office 24 September International Transfers NMAC Inspection 0 0 1 0 0 1
WL0V 3 October Lo2 Core Verification 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0LF 7 October As built DIV 0 0 1 0 0 2
WRRF 12 October Interim inspection 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0L1, W0L2, W0LS 21 October Interim + System Inspection 0 0 4 0 0 8
WL0V 19–20 October PIV 1 1 1 2 2 2
W0LS 28 October SNRI 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0LF 11 November System Inspection 0 0 1 0 0 2
W0L2 23 November Inspection of SFA 0 0 1 0 0 1
WL0V 4–5 May eFORK 0 0 1 0 0 4
WL0V 18–19 November SFAT 0 0 1 0 0 4
Olkiluoto 14–16 June GBUV 0 0 1 0 0 6
W0LS 29 November – 1 December GBUV 0 0 1 0 0 6
TOTAL 19 19 49 22 22 77
Note: At the Olkiluoto NPP, inspections are counted per MBA. MBA = material balance area, PIV = Physical Inventory Verification, CA = Complementary Access,  
ES = Environmental Sampling, NM = nuclear material, SFAT/eFORK/GBUV = methods of non-destructive assay.
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APPENDIX 3 International agreements and national 
legislation relevant to nuclear safeguards in Finland
Valid legislation, treaties and agreements concern-
ing safeguards of nuclear materials and other nu-
clear items at the end of 2010 in Finland (Finnish 
Treaty Series, FTS):
1. The Nuclear Energy Act, 11 December, 1987/990 
as amended.
2. The Nuclear Energy Decree, 12 February, 
1988/161 as amended.
3. The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons INFCIRC/140 (FTS 11/70).
4. The Agreement with the Kingdom of Belgium, 
the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic 
of germany, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the 
grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom 
of Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy 
Community and the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency in Implementation of Article III, 
(1) and (4) of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/193), 14 September 
1997. Valid for Finland from 1 October 1995.
5. The Protocol Additional to the Agreement be-
tween the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of 
Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal 
Republic of germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ire-
land, the Italian Republic, the grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg, the Kingdom of Netherlands, the 
Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the 
Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic En-
ergy Community and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency in Implementation of Article iii, 
(1) and (4) of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, 22 September 1998. Entered 
into force on 30 April 2004.
6. The Treaty establishing the European Atom-
ic Energy Community (Euratom Treaty), 25 
March 1957:
•	 R���������	N�	5�	���������	��	���	����	��	
Attachment VI, 22 December 1958
•	 R���������	N�	9�	�������	197�	�����	4	��	���	
Euratom Treaty, on determining concentra-
tions of ores, 2 February 1960.
7. Commission Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005, 
8 February 2005
8. Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 setting up 
a Community regime for the control of exports, 
transfer, brokering, and transit of dual use 
items.
9. The Agreement with the government of the 
United Kingdom of great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the government of the Republic of 
Finland for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses 
of Atomic Energy (FTS 16/69). Articles I, II, III 
and x expired on 20 February 1999.
10. The Agreement with the government of the 
Russian Federation (the Soviet Union signed) 
and the government of the Republic of Finland 
for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic 
Energy (FTS 39/69). Articles 1, 2, 3 and 11 ex-
pired on 1.12.2004.
11. The Agreement between the government of 
the Kingdom of Sweden and the government of 
the Republic of Finland for Co-operation in the 
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 580/70 (FTS 
41/70). Articles 1, 2 and 3 expired on 5.9.2000.
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12. The Agreement between Sweden and Finland 
concerning guidelines on export of nuclear ma-
terials, technology and equipment (FTS 20/83).
13. The Agreement between the government of Re-
public of Finland and the government of Cana-
da and Canada concerning the uses of nuclear 
materials, equipment, facilities and information 
transferred between Finland and Canada (FTS 
43/76). Substituted to the appropriate extent by 
the Agreement with the government of Canada 
and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom) in the peaceful Uses of Atomic En-
ergy, 6 October 1959 as amended.
14. The Agreement on implementation of the Agree-
ment with Finland and Canada concerning the 
uses of nuclear materials, equipment, facilities 
and information transferred between Finland 
and Canada (FTS 43/84).
15. The Agreement between the government of Re-
public of Finland and the government of Aus-
tralia concerning the transfer of nuclear mate-
rial between Finland and Australia (FTS2/80). 
Substituted to the appropriate extent by the 
Agreement between the government of Aus-
tralia and the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity concerning transfer of nuclear material 
from Australia to the European Atomic Energy 
Community.
16. The Agreement for Cooperation with the gov-
ernment of the Republic of Finland and the 
government of the United States concerning 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (FTS 37/92). 
Substituted to the appropriate extent by the 
Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses 
of Nuclear Energy with European Atomic En-
ergy Community and the USA.
17. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(FTS 15/2001). This treaty was ratified by Fin-
land in 2001, but will not enter into force before 
it is ratified by all 44 states listed in Annex II of 
the treaty.
